
Public storage, over-permissive IAM roles, unmonitored control planes and forgotten test environments — and how to close each one.
Cloud breaches are rarely exotic. In assessment after assessment the same four issues appear: storage exposed to the internet, IAM roles with wildcard permissions, control-plane logs that nobody reads, and non-production environments holding production data.
Fix permissions with evidence rather than intuition. Cloud providers report which permissions a principal has actually used; strip everything else and re-run the report a month later. This single exercise typically removes the majority of lateral-movement paths.
Turn the control plane into a detection surface. CloudTrail, Azure Activity and GCP Audit logs should feed your SIEM with alerts on identity policy changes, key creation, security group edits and logging being disabled.
Then prevent regression: policy-as-code in the pipeline, tagged ownership for every resource, and a scheduled sweep that deletes orphaned environments. Posture management tools help, but only when someone owns the queue.
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